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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a frequently utilized,1 expeditious and cost-effective
alternative to litigation.2 While additional advantages of arbitration
include privacy, specialized arbitrator expertise and party control over
†
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1
International Centre for Dispute Resolution, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28819
(last visited Dec. 27, 2008).
2
9 US NITA prec § 1; American Arbitration Association, http:
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28749 (last visited Dec. 27, 2008).
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the process,3 the most important feature of arbitration, and indeed, the
key to its success, is the public’s confidence and trust in the integrity of
the process.4 However, such confidence and trust is undermined when an
arbitration award is vacated for arbitrator evident partiality. Arbitrator
evident partiality, which is listed under the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”)5 as one ground for vacatur of an arbitration award,6
encompasses both an arbitrator’s explicit bias toward one party and an
arbitrator’s inferred bias when an arbitrator fails to disclose relevant
information to the parties.7 Arbitrator evident partiality is particularly
problematic because it is difficult to concretely define arbitrator evident
partiality, the standards for interpreting arbitrator evident partiality lack
consistency, and, furthermore, it is a frequently used basis for vacatur
under Section 10(a)(2).8
The FAA does not explicitly define evident partiality, and as a
result, the standards for what constitutes evident partiality are vague and
oftentimes conflicting.9 There are at least three judicial interpretations
regarding evident partiality: (1) an “appearance of partiality” standard,
(2) an “actual partiality” or bias standard, and (3) a “reasonable
impression of partiality” middle-ground standard.10 However, courts
3

9 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). See MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: ARBITRATION AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 12 (1995).
4
See Richard Chernick & Kimberly Taylor, Ethical Issues Specific to Arbitration, in
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A Comprehensive Guide 181 (Phyllis Bernard et al. eds.,
2004) (noting that “Canon I of the ABA/AAA Code of Ethics recognizes that for
commercial arbitration to be effective the public must have confidence in the integrity
and fairness of the process.”).
5
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000).
6
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000). The other three grounds are: (i) corruption, fraud, or
undue means; (ii) arbitrator misconduct or misbehavior; or (iii) where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers.
7
4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 138 (2008). See Jill Gross,
Grounds to Challenge FINRA Arbitrators (Working Paper Series, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1504110.
8
See 9 US NITA prec § 1 (noting that vacatur under § 10 is where most battles are
fought; vacatur under § 10(a)(2) frequently turns on the undisclosed bias of an arbitrator
and “whether that bias was substantial enough to taint the award”). For an illustrative
example of a finding of evident partiality on the part of the arbitrator, see Morelite
Constr. Corp. v. New York District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d
Cir. 1984) (evident partiality found where there was a father-son relationship between the
arbitrator and an officer of one of the parties to the dispute).
9
4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 138 (2008).
10
Id. The three interpretations are: (1) that arbitrators are expected to be “completely
impartial,” with absolutely “no connection with the parties or the dispute involved which
might give the appearance of partiality” unless otherwise agreed to by the parties; (2) that
“an appearance of bias” will only disqualify an arbitrator where an arbitrator exhibits
some sort of personal interest, e.g., a pecuniary interest; and (3) that a “reasonable
impression of partiality” establishes when an arbitrator possesses a duty to disclose
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have construed these three standards in a variety of fashions and, as a
result, there is presently no uniformity regarding the definition of evident
partiality.11
Without a precise definition of arbitrator evident partiality, the
implications for vacatur predicated upon evident partiality are serious.12
First, the issue of remedy is far from certain. The FAA does not mandate
or compel certain action once an award is vacated.13 The statute
indicates that if an award is vacated within the timeframe prescribed by
the arbitration agreement for an award to be rendered, then a court “may,
in its discretion,” order a rehearing on the matter.14 Where bias, fraud,
corruption, or other misconduct is involved, courts often remand to a
new arbitrator.15 Conversely, if the relevant timeframe in the agreement
has lapsed, then the issue of remedy becomes even less clear, as the FAA
is completely silent on that point.16 Even if a court remands to a different
arbitrator, the parties still face another arbitration proceeding. Thus, the
vacated award ultimately fails to resolve a given dispute; the parties are
in court and basically have to start at the beginning of the arbitration
process. Second, a vacated award has broader implications: if the public
does not have confidence in the finality of an award, then the integrity of
the process is compromised.17 More to the point, if the public does not
have confidence in the fairness and impartial nature of an arbitration
proceeding, then the integrity of the process as a whole is similarly
undermined.
This Comment suggests a way to ease the confusion regarding the
definition of arbitrator evident partiality and to also reinforce the public’s
perception of the integrity of the arbitration process by imposing an
(further noting that arbitrator evident partiality consists of a “middle ground” between the
“appearance of bias” standard and the “actual bias” standard). Id.
11
See supra note 10 and infra Part II.
12
See David Allen Larson, Conflicts of Interest and Disclosures: Are We Making a
Mountain Out of a Molehill?, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 879, 882–83 (2008) (indicating that
vacatur based on an arbitrator’s failure to disclose a conflict of interest is captured by the
acronym “WAFAA”: the “Worst Alternative to a Final Arbitration Award” and noting
that vacatur is a “catastrophic consequence[] of failing to disclose”).
13
See William H. Hardie, Arbitration: Post-Award Procedures, 60 ALA. L. REV. 314,
324 (1999).
14
9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2000).
15
In re: A.H. Robins Co. v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 1999 230 B.R. 82, 86
(E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2009).
16
9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2000). See William H. Hardie, supra note 13.
17
See MARTIN DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 15 (2002) (contending that the
advantages of arbitration are lost once any aspect of the arbitration is challenged in
court). See also Chernick & Taylor, supra note 4, at 179 (noting that “it is essential that
the arbitration process be fair and the arbitrator impartial. It is also important that the
parties have confidence in the integrity of the process.”).
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affirmative duty to investigate on an arbitrator. Stated simply, an
arbitrator should have a legally independent affirmative duty to run a
conflict check prior to the commencement of an arbitration and disclose
the results to the parties. This will allow the parties to make an informed
decision as to the arbitrator’s partiality, thereby minimizing the risk of
award vacatur for arbitrator evident partiality. Whether or not this duty
is met will be judged by an objective standard.
This affirmative duty to investigate will minimize the focus on
actual and/or constructive knowledge—what an arbitrator knows, should
know, or might potentially know based upon the actions an arbitrator did
take or should have taken in order to make an adequate disclosure.
While the determination of actual knowledge may be objective, assessing
constructive knowledge is inherently subjective. Instead of trying to
evaluate an arbitrator’s subjective state of mind, the process of
arbitration will be better served by the imposition of an affirmative duty
on an arbitrator to investigate potential conflicts and disclose the results
of the investigation. Such a free-standing duty would eliminate the need
for conducting a subjective balancing test to measure the sufficiency of a
disclosure. While one could contend that an additional step in the
arbitration process is not needed, the judicial response to arbitrator
evident partiality clearly indicates that an additional step is most
assuredly needed.
Part II will explore the pillar of the doctrine, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.
Setting forth an “impression of possible bias” standard,18 the opinion is
fraught with ambiguities concerning the nature and scope of evident
partiality. Part III will give an overview of subsequent judicial
interpretations of evident partiality, with particular emphasis placed on
the Second and Ninth Circuit’s divergent approaches. While the Second
and the Ninth Circuits both employ subjective reasonableness
standards,19 the two circuits differ in the context of an affirmative duty to
investigate possible conflicts of interest. Although the Second Circuit
18
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (plurality
opinion).
19
The Second Circuit utilizes a “reasonable person” standard, whereas the Ninth
Circuit utilizes a “reasonable impression of partiality” standard. See infra note 51. The
Third Circuit utilizes a “‘reasonably construed’ bias standard”, which is functionally
equivalent to the Second and Ninth Circuits’ standard. See HSM Constr. Servs., Inc. v.
MDC Systems, Inc., No. 06-2584, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16964, at **10 (3d Cir. July
16, 2007) (citing Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1523 n.30 (3d
Cir. 1994), aff’d, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)) (noting that the “First, Second, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the reasonably construed bias
standard, albeit not under that name.”).
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has refused to impose a free-standing affirmative duty to investigate
potential conflicts, it does, under certain circumstances, impose on an
arbitrator a duty to take some action.20 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit is
more willing to explicitly impose an affirmative duty on an arbitrator to
investigate and disclose a potential conflict.21 Part IV will examine
several sets of model guidelines to aid in the analysis of imposing a duty
to investigate on an arbitrator. These guidelines have been promulgated
by both domestic and international arbitration bodies, including the
American Bar Association / American Arbitration Association’s Code of
Ethics and the International Bar Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of
Interest of International Arbitration. Finally, Part V will posit that these
various issues warrant a reexamination of the arbitrator’s duty
throughout the arbitration process. In light of the divergent judicial
interpretations of evident partiality, a new approach to the arbitrator
impartiality calculus is needed. An affirmative free-standing duty to
investigate will help reinforce the notion of party self-determinism,
meaning the parties themselves should evaluate an arbitrator’s partiality
instead of the arbitrator himself or herself. The imposition of an
affirmative duty to investigate on an arbitrator, similar to the Ninth
Circuit’s approach, could alleviate much of the current ambiguity and
uncertainty that exists throughout the various courts.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENT PARTIALITY
In order to comprehend the universe of arbitrator evident partiality,
it is necessary to first consider where the uncertainty all began: the
Supreme Court’s 1968 opinion in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v.
Continental Casualty Co.22 In this case, the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether impartiality, a requirement for every judicial
proceeding, applied to an arbitration dispute.23 Although the Court
provided an affirmative answer, the opinion was an unclear delineation
of the standard for evident partiality.24
The underlying matter involved a dispute between a subcontractor
and a prime contractor for a painting job.25 The contract between the two
20

Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492
F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2007).
21
New Regency Prod., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th
Cir. 2007).
22
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (plurality
opinion). For a discussion of whether Justice Black’s opinion was in fact a plurality
opinion, see infra note 38.
23
Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 145 (plurality opinion).
24
Id.
25
Id. at 146.
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parties contained an arbitration agreement.26 Pursuant to the agreement,
the petitioner appointed one of the arbitrators, the respondent appointed a
second arbitrator, and then the two selected arbitrators appointed the
third and final arbitrator.27 The third arbitrator had a large business and
served as a consultant for individuals regarding building construction
projects.28 The prime contractor-respondent was one of the third
arbitrator’s “regular customers,”29 despite the two parties having had
what the Court deemed a “sporadic” relationship.30 Although the
arbitrator had not conducted any business dealings with the prime
contractor for approximately one year prior to the commencement of the
arbitration proceeding, the prime contractor paid the arbitrator a
significant amount of money over a four to five year time span and even
rendered services on the projects involved in the underlying lawsuit.31
An arbitration proceeding took place, but the “close business
connections” between the arbitrator and the prime contractor were not
known by the petitioner, nor were they revealed by anyone until after the
award had already been rendered.32 The petitioner challenged the award,
but the District Court refused to vacate, and the Court of Appeals
subsequently affirmed the award.33 Both courts concluded that the FAA
did not support vacatur of the award.34 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari35 and reversed, thus vacating the award.36
The plurality opinion,37 authored by Justice Black, adopted an
elusive “impression of bias” standard.38 Attempting to “safeguard the
impartiality of arbitrators,” the Court held that arbitrators must disclose
26

Id.
Id.
28
Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 146 (plurality opinion).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 382 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1967).
34
Id.
35
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 390 U.S. 979 (1968).
36
Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 146–47.
37
Much debate has revolved around whether Justice Black wrote for a plurality or a
majority of the Court. See Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage
Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 2007) (“A majority of circuit courts have concluded
that Justice White’s [concurring] opinion did not lend majority status to the plurality
opinion.”); Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO, 960 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. 1997) (“Although
Justices White and Marshall joined fully in Justice Black’s opinion for the Court, some
lower federal courts have purported to see a conflict between the two writings. By
treating Justice Black’s opinion as a mere plurality, they have felt free to reject the
suggestion that ‘evident partiality’ is met by an ‘appearance of bias,’ and to apply a much
narrower standard.”).
38
Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 149.
27

2009]

ARBITRATOR EVIDENT PARTIALITY

197

to the parties “any dealings that might create an impression of possible
bias.”39 Under this standard, any connection or relationship an arbitrator
has that might give rise to an “impression of possible bias” must be
disclosed to the parties in order to preclude a finding of evident partiality
sufficient to warrant award vacatur.40 The Court recognized that
arbitrators are inherently part of the business world; however, because of
the special position arbitrators occupy in a disputed matter, with their
authorization to decide the law and are free from appellate review, the
Court imposed a high standard of impartiality on arbitrators.41 In the
plurality opinion’s final paragraph, the Court opined that underlying this
standard of evident partiality is “the premise that any tribunal permitted
by law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also
must avoid even the appearance of bias.”42
Justice White, along with Justice Marshall, joined in the decision
but wrote a separate concurring opinion to make what he referred to as
39

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
41
Id. Essentially, the plurality imposed on arbitrators the same standard of
impartiality applicable for Article III judges. 28 U.S.C. § 455 sets forth the judicial
standard of impartiality. § 455(a) states that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate
[magistrate judge] . . . shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.” § 455(b) enumerates the situations in which a judge
must disqualify himself. This includes “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding” as well as where “[h]e knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his
spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding” and where “[h]e or his spouse,
or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them . . . [i]s a party to the
proceeding” or “[i]s acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2008).
Judge Wiener, who concurred in Judge Reavley’s dissent in Positive Software Solutions,
Inc., emphasized the differences between an Article III judge and an arbitrator. Positive
Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir.
2007) (Wiener, J., dissenting). Judge Wiener noted that, unlike an Article III judge, an
arbitrator is selected not by an “objectively random or blind assignment through long
established court procedures” but by the parties themselves. Id. As such, Judge Wiener
posited that the parties alone have the “sole authority and duty to determine whether a
candidate for the post of arbitrator should be accepted or rejected.” Id. In order to make
an informed determination, Judge Wiener concludes that an arbitrator must disclose to
the parties “every relationship [no matter how “tenuous or remote”], without selfabridgement by the potential arbitrator . . . [f]iltration of partiality in arbitration is the
exclusive prerogative and duty of the parties . . . [a]s gatekeepers, the parties are charged
with guarding against favoritism and prejudice, a duty that they cannot possibly discharge
in the absence of total disclosure.” Id.
42
Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 150. It is implicitly assumed that the
“appearance of bias” language from the last paragraph reflects the functional equivalent
of the “impression of possible bias” standard. However, it is arguable that there is a
difference between the two phrases, thus demonstrating why the Court’s precise holding
in Commonwealth Coatings is hard to discern.
40
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“additional remarks.”43 Unfortunately, this concurring opinion created
additional confusion as to what constitutes the applicable standard of
evident partiality.44 Justice White attempted to limit the scope of evident
partiality to instances where an arbitrator has a “substantial interest” in
the dispute before disclosure is required.45 In Justice White’s opinion,
arbitrators should not automatically be disqualified from an arbitration
proceeding because of a business relationship where both parties are
aware of the relationship in advance, or where the parties are unaware of
the circumstances but the relationship is trivial.46 However, in the event
that the arbitrator has a “substantial interest” in the transaction at hand,
such information must be disclosed.47
Combining the “impression of possible bias” standard with an
unclear definition as to what constitutes “substantial interest,” the
Court’s evident partiality framework has failed to provide courts with
much guidance in handling arbitrator evident partiality. The ensuing
result is a fact-sensitive, case-by-case inquiry into each dispute with little
predictability as to future outcomes.48
III. CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO EVIDENT PARTIALITY
Courts have subsequently grappled with how to resolve the
imprecise standard of evident partiality arising out of Commonwealth

43

Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that “the
majority did not articulate a succinct standard”).
45
Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 151 (White, J., concurring). [If you
are going to use the short name, then you should be consistent throughout.]
46
Id.
47
Id. at 151–52.
48
See Ann Ryan Robertson, Feature, International Arbitration in the U.S.: Evident
Partiality Based on Nondisclosure: Betwixt and Between, 45 HOUSTON LAWYER 22, 23
(2007) (noting that the “confusion in the Commonwealth Coatings opinion gave lower
courts little guidance, and most courts struggled with the import of Justice White’s
concurrence . . . There is no consensus among the circuits, but the test that has emerged
can best be characterized as a case-by-case objective inquiry into partiality or a
reasonable impression of bias standard.”) See also Judge Wiener’s dissent in Positive
Software Solutions, Inc. (differentiating between disclosure and disqualification of an
arbitrator; emphasizing that “Justice White did not ‘remark’ that the differences between
the standards of decorum applicable to judges and those to which arbitrators are held has
anything at all to do with the immutable prerequisite that, before the parties sign off on a
candidate for arbitrator, they must have received from him an unexpurgated disclosure of
absolutely every past or present relationship with the parties and their lawyers”; and
further noting that “Justice White’s remark that disqualification is not automatic for
minor business relationships is simply inapposite to the requirement of full disclosure of
every relationship, large and small.”) Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century
Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2007) (Wiener, J., dissenting).
44
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Coatings.49 The differing approaches of the Second and Ninth Circuits
in regard to evident partiality are particularly illustrative of such
divergence in judicial interpretation and application.50 While both courts
appear to employ an evident partiality standard based upon
reasonableness, the two courts differ in their willingness to impose any
affirmative duty to investigate on the arbitrator.
A. The Second Circuit’s Approach
The Second Circuit addressed the issue of evident partiality in
Morelite Construction Corp. v. New York District Council Carpenters
Benefit Funds.51 In this landmark case, the appellant challenged an
arbitration award because the arbitrator’s father served as a prominent
figure within one of the appellees’ corporate hierarchies.52 Finding that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth Coatings did not
resolve the issue of what constitutes evident partiality, the court noted
that it was left with “little guidance” in applying the correct standard for
evident partiality under Section 10 of the FAA.53
The court recognized Justice Black’s “appearance of bias” standard,
but found it irreconcilable with Justice White’s concurrence.54 Positing
that most of the plurality’s opinion must therefore be interpreted as dicta,
the court set about resolving the issue of what standard satisfies evident
partiality.55 The court concluded that an “appearance of bias” standard
was too low to satisfy the evident partiality standard, since arbitration
often involves a “trade-off” between arbitrator impartiality and expertise
on one hand, and the fact that arbitration is voluntary in nature on the
49

See Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO, 960 S.W. 2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1997) (noting that
state courts are “divided between the broader [evident partiality] view reflected by
Schmitz and the narrower view of Morelite”).
50
Compare Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 84 (adopting a “reasonable person”
standard of evident partiality) and Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine
Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2007) (reinforcing its “reasonable
person” standard of evident partiality; also, finding no affirmative duty per se, but when
an arbitrator thinks that there might be a nontrivial conflict of interest, the arbitrator must
either investigate the potential conflict or disclose his reasoning for why there might
potentially be a conflict and his intention not to investigate into the matter) with Schmitz,
20 F.3d at 1046 (adopting a “reasonable impression of partiality” standard and suggesting
that an arbitrator might have an affirmative duty to investigate) and New Regency, 501
F.3d at 1101 (implied affirmative duty to investigate).
51
Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 79.
52
Id. at 81.
53
Id. at 82–83.
54
Id. at 83. The court read Justice White’s concurrence as holding arbitrators to a
distinctly lower standard than the plurality opinion and thus stated that “[f]our justices . . .
do not constitute a majority of the Supreme Court.” Id.
55
Id.
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other hand.56 The court also concluded that the “proof of actual bias”
standard was too high, for partiality would be hard, if not impossible, to
prove.57 As a result, the court adopted a “reasonable person” standard,
whereby “evident partiality . . . will be found where a reasonable person
would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the
arbitration.”58
In Morelite, the court focused on the father-son relationship, and
without knowing more details about the relationship itself, vacated the
award for evident partiality.59 Despite indicating that “[w]e know
nothing more about the relationship” between the father and son, the
court concluded that “we are bound by our strong feeling that sons are
more often than not loyal to their fathers, partial to their fathers, and
biased on behalf of their fathers.”60
The Second Circuit revisited evident partiality in Applied Industrial
Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S.61 This case
involved an arbitrator who had purposefully constructed a “Chinese
Wall”62 to shield himself from learning about any contract negotiations
between a division of his company and the appellant’s parent
corporation.63 The court vacated the award because the arbitrator knew,
at a minimum, that a potential conflict of interest existed; yet, he failed to
either investigate the matter or to disclose the existence of the “Chinese
Wall” to the parties.64
The court reiterated its “reasonable person” standard and also added
an additional burden on arbitrators—the duty to investigate.65 The court
first posited that “arbitrators must take steps to ensure that the parties are
not misled into believing that no nontrivial conflict exists.”66 Then, the
court held that if an arbitrator thinks that a “nontrivial conflict of interest
56

Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 84.
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 135.
62
A “Chinese Wall,” also termed an “ethical wall,” is defined as “a screening
mechanism that protects a client from a conflict of interest by preventing one or more
lawyers within an organization from participating in any matter involving the client.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). The party relying on the “Chinese Wall”
bears the burden of demonstrating its effectiveness. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law §
189 (2008) (referencing Howitt v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1574 (Cal. App. 4th
1992).
63
Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 135.
64
Id. The court did mention in a footnote that it was unprepared to conclude that a
“Chinese Wall” was an insufficient substitute for investigation.
65
Id. at 137–38.
66
Id.
57
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might exist,” the arbitrator must either (i) conduct an investigation into
the potential conflict, or (ii) disclose to the parties why he or she thinks
there could be a conflict.67 Further, the arbitrator must disclose his intent
not to investigate the matter.68 The court emphatically rejected the
notion that it was creating a free-standing per se affirmative duty to
investigate.69 The court stated that an arbitrator’s failure to investigate is
insufficient to vacate an arbitration award; however, evident partiality
arises when the arbitrator is aware of a potential conflict and fails to
either investigate the matter or inform the parties of his intent not to
investigate.70 Thus, knowledge of a potential conflict triggers either the
duty to investigate or the duty to disclose that the arbitrator will not
investigate.
Because the court focused almost exclusively on the disclosure
aspect of its evident partiality standard and failed to confront the duty to
investigate directly, its opinion sends mixed signals regarding the
applicable duty to investigate standard. The court explicitly stated that it
was not creating an affirmative duty to investigate; however, the court
also emphasized that, had the arbitrator conducted an investigation into
the possible conflict, he would have found that a relationship between his
company and the plaintiff’s parent corporation “already existed” and,
even more importantly, that the relationship had resulted in a significant
amount of revenue.71 Furthermore, the court’s standard was premised on
the notion that even the mere possibility of a nontrivial conflict of
interest triggers an arbitrator’s duty to take some affirmative action:
either investigate or disclose the arbitrator’s intent not to investigate the
matter. Thus, while the court stated that it did not intend to create an
affirmative duty to investigate, it is arguable that the court did create
some type of duty by requiring that the arbitrator take affirmative action
where there might be some potential conflict of interest. After all, the
court’s impartiality standard is not satisfied simply because an arbitrator
sincerely thought that no conflict of interest initially existed.72 If an
arbitrator possesses a continuing duty to disclose conflicts, subsequent
events can trigger the arbitrator’s duty to either conduct an additional

67

Id. (emphasis added).
Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 137–138.
Id. at 135 (“We emphasize that we are not creating a free-standing duty to
investigate.”).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 139.
72
Id. (“[A]s Commonwealth Coatings and Morelite make clear, subjective good faith
is not the test.”).
68
69
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investigation into potential conflicts or disclose his or her intent not to
investigate. 73
Following the Second Circuit’s holdings in Morelite and Applied
Industrial Materials Corp., an arbitrator has a duty to ensure that the
parties to a dispute do not think that there is not a conflict of interest, or
at least, that there is no nontrivial conflict of interest.74 In order to
discharge that burden, an arbitrator who thinks that a “nontrivial conflict
of interest might exist[]”75 must either investigate the possible conflict or
disclose why he thinks there might be a conflict of interest and explain
his intent not to investigate into the matter.76
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Approach
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the conundrum of applying
Commonwealth Coatings’ evident partiality standard in Schmitz v.
Zilveti.77 In this case, a dispute was submitted to arbitration under the
National Association of Securities Dealers (the “NASD”).78 Three
arbitrators were selected to hear the matter.79 One of the arbitrators
failed to run a conflict check on the appellee’s parent company—a
company his law firm had represented on numerous occasions.80 The
appellants challenged the arbitration award.81 The district court
concluded that an arbitrator is required to disclose only the facts that he
or she is aware of at the time of the proceeding, and since the arbitrator
did not know of his firm’s conflict of interest, the district court
concluded that the arbitrator’s lack of knowledge did not establish
evident partiality.82 On appeal, the court vacated the panel’s award.83
The court looked at prior Ninth Circuit cases involving actual bias and
adopted a “reasonable impression of partiality” standard, deeming it to
be the most accurate expression of the Commonwealth Coatings
standard.84 The court drew a distinction between cases involving an
arbitrator’s nondisclosure of potential conflicts and those cases of actual
73

Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 139.
Id.
Id. 139 (emphasis added).
76
Id.
77
Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1043.
78
Id. at 1044. See also infra note 93.
79
Id.
80
Id. The arbitrator’s law firm had represented the party’s parent company in at least
nineteen cases over a time span of thirty-five years.
81
Id.
82
Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1044–45.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1046 (quoting Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11th
Cir. 1982)).
74
75
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arbitrator bias.85 In the former situation, the court indicated that a
“reasonable impression of partiality” standard suffices because, as a
policy matter, the parties are supposed to select the arbitrator
“intelligently,” and they can do so “only when facts showing potential
partiality are disclosed.”86
The court went beyond merely articulating its standard of evident
partiality, however, and explicitly imposed an affirmative duty to
investigate in “certain circumstances”87—without concisely defining
which circumstances gave rise to such an affirmative duty.88 The Ninth
Circuit distinguished this duty to investigate from Commonwealth
Coatings’ duty to disclose, and stated that a failure to investigate could
give rise to a “reasonable impression of partiality.”89 The court reasoned
that even an arbitrator’s constructive knowledge of a conflict can give
rise to a “reasonable impression of partiality.”90
In the case at hand, the procedural rules of the NASD Code
governed the dispute.91 Under the NASD Code, an arbitrator should
investigate potential conflicts of interest.92 As the arbitrator in the
dispute failed to investigate his law firm’s prior representation of one of
the appellee’s parent companies, the court concluded that the arbitrator’s
constructive knowledge established evident partiality.93 The court,
recalling that the parties themselves are the judges of arbitrator
partiality,94 specifically stated that the imposition of an affirmative duty
to investigate encourages candor and honest disclosure of information
that an arbitrator might otherwise be inclined to keep secret from the
parties.95 The court opined that the dual duties of investigation and

85

Id. at 1047.
Id.
87
Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048 (emphasis added).
88
The court did note that “the parties can expect a lawyer/arbitrator to investigate
and disclose conflicts he has with actual parties to the arbitration.” Id. (citing Close v.
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)).
89
Id. at 1047–48.
90
Id. at 1048 (“That the lawyer forgot to run a conflict check or had forgotten that he
had previously represented the party is not an excuse.”).
91
Id. at 1044.
92
Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1044 (“The NASD Code . . . requires arbitrators to make an
investigation regarding potential conflicts of interest. NASD Code section 23(b)
provides: “Persons who are requested to accept appointment as arbitrators should make a
reasonable effort to inform themselves of any interests or relationships described in
Paragraph (a) above.”) (emphasis added).
93
Id. at 1048–49.
94
See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (1968)
(plurality opinion).
95
Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048.
86
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disclosure “must be enforced, even if later a court finds that no actual
bias was present.”96
While the court’s imposition of an affirmative duty to investigate is
a useful tool for ensuring that arbitrators are impartial to the proceedings
at hand, its framework lacks definition, for it did not articulate
specifically that arbitrators have a blanket duty to investigate potential
conflicts. Indeed, the court did not define when arbitrators have such a
duty, or for that matter, that all arbitrators inherently possess that duty by
virtue of their position as arbitrators. The court only stated that
arbitrators are required “in certain circumstances” to conduct an
investigation.97 Although the court did not elaborate on what constitutes
“certain circumstances,” or conversely, when an arbitrator does not have
a duty to investigate, the court did indicate that when potential partiality
is the issue, “no such imputation can arise.”98 Thus, while the court did
not adopt a per se rule that every arbitrator in every circumstance must
independently undertake an investigation into possible conflicts of
interest, the court’s language seems to indicate that it is theoretically
inclined to adopt such a position in the future.99
The Ninth Circuit recently revisited the issue and similarly imposed
an affirmative duty on an arbitrator to investigate and disclose a potential
conflict. In New Regency Productions, Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films,
Inc., the court affirmed the vacatur of an arbitration award where the
arbitrator failed to investigate and disclose possible conflicts arising from
his acceptance of employment with a film group currently in negotiations
with the appellant corporation.100 The court referenced its holding in
Schmitz and restated that it utilized a “reasonable impression of
partiality” standard.101 Again noting that evident partiality can exist
despite an arbitrator’s actual knowledge of a conflict, the court explained
that an arbitrator “may have a duty to investigate independent of [his] . . .
duty to disclose.”102 Furthermore, the court noted that the arbitrator in
Schmitz had a duty to investigate, and as the arbitrator failed to discharge
his burden, his constructive knowledge of a conflict gave rise to evident

96

Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1048 (emphasis added).
98
Id. (quoting Justice White’s concurrence in Commonwealth Coatings).
99
Id. at 1049. For instance, the court stated that “[i]f the parties are to be judges of
the arbitrators’ partiality, duties to investigate and disclose conflicts must be enforced,
even if a later court finds that no actual bias was present” (citing Close v. Motorists Mut.
Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 1275, 1278–79 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)).
100
New Regency, 501 F.3d at 1111.
101
Id. at 1106.
102
Id. (citing Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048).
97
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partiality.103 The court, noting that it did not adopt a per se rule in
Schmitz whereby arbitrators possess a duty to investigate “in all cases,”
nevertheless held that the arbitrator in the case at hand did have an
affirmative duty to investigate when he accepted employment during the
course of the arbitration proceeding.104
To arrive at its conclusion, the court cited the Second Circuit’s
decision in Applied Industrial Materials Corp. for the proposition that an
arbitrator’s constructive knowledge could satisfy evident partiality.105
Then, the court noted that while the Second Circuit explicitly declined to
impose an affirmative duty to investigate, the Second Circuit requires an
arbitrator, who believes that there might be a conflict of interest, to either
investigate into the matter or disclose his intent not to investigate.106 The
court also examined a citation in Applied Industrial Materials Corp.,107
which noted that while the Fourth Circuit did not impose a blanket duty
to investigate, the Fourth Circuit “suggested that should the arbitrator fail
to perform due diligence in identifying conflicts,” evident partiality could
warrant vacatur.108 After elaborating on the Second Circuit’s decision in
Applied Industrial Materials Corp. and noting that the court knew of
only one appellate court that has a “per se rule” that an arbitrator’s lack
of actual knowledge precludes evident partiality,109 the Ninth Circuit
found that the situation at hand paralleled the matter facing the Second
Circuit. As such, the arbitrator should have investigated potential
conflicts prior to accepting the new employment.110 The court concluded
that the arbitrator had constructive knowledge of a potential conflict
when he accepted an executive position with a company in the same
industry as the parties to the arbitration.111 Therefore, the arbitrator
should have investigated any potential conflicts.112

103

Id. at 1107.
Id. at 1109.
105
New Regency, 501 F.3d at 1108 (citing Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar
Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2007)).
106
Id.
107
ANR Coal Co. v Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1999).
108
New Regency, 501 F.3d at 1109 (noting that “[t]he court declined to recognize that
an arbitrator has a general duty to investigate, but suggested that should the arbitrator fail
to perform due diligence in identifying conflicts, an undiscovered, ‘not trivial’ conflict
may result in vacatur.”).
109
Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d
1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 1998).
110
New Regency, 501 F.3d at 1109.
111
Id. (citing Applied Industrial Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi,
A.S., the court explained that “[w]e believe that his decision to accept a new high-level
executive job at a company in the same industry as the parties during the arbitration is
precisely the type of situation ‘where an arbitrator has reason to believe that a nontrivial
104
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The court also noted that the arbitration proceeding was governed
by the American Film Marketing Association (“AFMA”).113 Under the
AFMA arbitral rules, an arbitrator is required to disclose any
circumstances that might evince partiality according to either the
procedural law of the place of arbitration or, if none is indicated, in
accordance with the laws of California.114 Under California law, an
arbitrator in an international arbitration matter possesses an ongoing
obligation to disclose any information which might raise doubts about
the arbitrator’s partiality.115 Recognizing that the language does not
explicitly state that an arbitrator has an affirmative duty to investigate,
the court concluded that the language “necessarily implicates a duty to
investigate whether instances of potential conflict exist.”116
By “implicat[ing] a duty to investigate” despite the existence of any
“potential conflict,” the court seemingly imposed an affirmative duty on
an arbitrator to investigate regardless of whether there is an actual,
potential, or even no conflict.117 The court referenced several arbitral
guidelines, including the American Arbitration Association and
American Bar Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes and the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts
of Interest in International Arbitration, which explicitly posit an
affirmative duty to investigate.118 While acknowledging that the
referenced guidelines were not binding,119 the court relied on the
guidelines, along with “an attorney’s traditional duty to avoid conflicts of
conflict of interest might exist’ and should investigate to determine the existence of
potential conflicts.”).
112
Id. at 1109.
113
Id. at 1103, 1109.
114
Id. at 1109. The court referenced AFMA Rules for International Arbitration
Section 6.5.
115
New Regency, 501 F.3d. at 1109, 1111 (citing California Code of Civil Procedure
§§ 1297.121, 1297.13, and 1297.123).
116
Id. at 1109 (citing HSMV Corp. v. ADI Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1129 (C.D. Cal.
1999), disapproved on other grounds in Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386
F.3d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 2004)).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 1109–10 (noting that “Canon II(B) of the code [the American Arbitration
Association and American Bar Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes] . . . provides that arbitrators have an ongoing duty to ‘make a reasonable effort
to inform themselves of any interests or relationships’ subject to disclosure” and that
“General Standard 7(c) of the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of
Interest in International Arbitration (2004) states that ‘[a]n arbitrator is under a duty to
make reasonable enquiries to investigate any potential conflicts of interest, as well as any
facts or circumstances that may cause his or her impartiality or independence to be
questioned.’”).
119
Id. at 1110. However, the court cited Commonwealth Coatings’ treatment of the
AAA rules as “persuasive authority.” Id.
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interest” to reinforce its holding in Schmitz that constructive knowledge
can satisfy evident partiality where an arbitrator fails to investigate
potential conflicts, and, in general, to impose an affirmative duty to
investigate.120
Although the court did not state that it was adopting a per se duty to
investigate requirement in all arbitration proceedings, the court’s
opinions in Schmitz and New Regency hint at such a conclusion. Even if
one interprets the New Regency decision more narrowly, that is, to hold
that an arbitrator must investigate potential conflicts when there is a
change in circumstances, the court has still provided a more useful and
workable framework for approaching the evident partiality quagmire.
Coupling Schmitz with New Regency, the Ninth Circuit appears to be
moving closer to a general affirmative duty to investigate.
While the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have interpreted the
evident partiality standard in a similar fashion, the two circuits diverge in
their willingness to impose a duty to investigate. In the Second Circuit, a
duty to investigate arises only when an arbitrator has some reason to
think that a “nontrivial conflict of interest”121 might exist. In that
particular circumstance, an arbitrator is required to either investigate the
conflict, or disclose why the arbitrator thinks a conflict might exist and
his decision not to investigate further.122 Where a potential nontrivial
conflict of interest exists, an arbitrator’s failure to either investigate or
disclose his intent to not investigate is sufficient for a finding of evident
partiality.123 However, an examination of Applied Industrial Materials
Corp. reveals that the court did create an affirmative duty to act. For
instance, an arbitrator cannot simply turn a blind eye to the existence of a
nontrivial conflict; he or she cannot actively mislead the parties into
thinking that there is no nontrivial conflict of interest when such a
conflict does actually exist.124 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
imposes an affirmative duty to investigate where changed circumstances
in the course of the arbitration proceeding could result in a potential
conflict.125

120

New Regency, 501 F.3d. at 1110.
Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 138.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
See Steven Smith et al., International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 42 INT’L
LAW 363, 368–69 (2008) (“The Second Circuit’s refusal to impose a free-standing duty
to investigate seems at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in New Regency, which
found an affirmative duty to investigate when a change in circumstances could potentially
create conflicts.”).
121
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IV. ARBITRATION MODEL GUIDELINES
In addition to judicial decisions on the arbitrator’s duties, several
model guidelines hold particular relevance to the matter at hand by
suggesting an affirmative duty to investigate. The guidelines are not
binding as law and hence often take the form of a code of ethics, but they
are evidence of “soft” law in the field.126 In fact, they could provide an
additional lens through which to view the evident partiality dilemma,
which arises due to the disconnect between trying to establish an
objective standard by which to evaluate arbitrator impartiality and the
reality that the standard is inherently subjective in nature. At the core of
arbitration model rules is the notion that an arbitrator must be and remain
neutral and impartial.127 However, two noteworthy guidelines do contain
an affirmative duty to investigate: the American Arbitration Association
and American Bar Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in
Commercial Disputes (“AAA / ABA Code of Ethics”) and the
International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest of
International Arbitration (“IBA Guidelines”). If one utilizes these
guidelines in examining evident partiality, it becomes apparent that an
affirmative duty to investigate could alleviate much of the difficulties
surrounding domestic and international arbitration.
A. The American Arbitration Association / American Bar Association
Code of Ethics
Canon II of the AAA / ABA Code of Ethics articulates how an
arbitrator should conduct himself. Entitled “An Arbitrator Should
Disclose Any Interest or Relationship Likely to Affect Impartiality or
Which Might Create an Appearance of Partiality,” Canon II recommends
that an arbitrator “should make a reasonable effort to inform [him or
herself] of any interests or relationships,” including any financial or
personal interest in the resolution of the proceeding, as well as any
existing or past relationship which could render a selected neutral

126

See Mark Kantor, Arbitrator Disclosure: An Active But Unsettled Year, INT.
A.L.R. 2008, 11(1), 20–32 (noting, for instance, that “[t]he ABA / AAA Code of Ethics
states that it is non-binding. Still, the AAA requires arbitrators in AAA proceedings, as a
condition to appointment, to execute an arbitrator’s oath agreeing to follow the Code of
Ethics’ disclosure obligations.”).
127
See, e.g., AAA International Arbitration Rules, which states that “[a]rbitrators
acting under these Rules shall be impartial and independent.” Am. Arbitration Ass’n,
International Arbitration Rules art. 7, P 1 (2008), available at http://adr.org/sp.asp?id=
33994#INTERNATIONAL%20ARBITRATION%20RULES.
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impartial.128 While the AAA / ABA Code does not explicitly state that
there is a free-standing duty to investigate, its does recommend that an
arbitrator inform him or herself about any possible conflicts, which gives
rise to the conclusion that there is an affirmative duty to investigate. In
fact, one could argue that the duty to disclose inherently triggers a duty
to investigate129 since an arbitrator cannot effectively disclose that which
he or she does not know in the first place. Although the AAA / ABA
Code of Ethics couches this duty to investigate in terms of a duty to
disclose, from a practical standpoint, it is illogical that an arbitrator could
make an effective disclosure absent an investigation. Ignorance of a
conflict does not appear to be a sufficient excuse,130 as the AAA / ABA
Code of Ethics states that an arbitrator’s duty to disclose is a “continuing
duty” and where there is any uncertainty in whether an arbitrator should
disclose a possible conflict, “[a]ny doubt . . . should be resolved in favor
of disclosure.”131
While useful in its recommendation that an arbitrator investigate
possible conflicts, the AAA / ABA Code of Ethics is also problematic for
three main reasons. First, it does not posit that the duty to investigate is a
free-standing duty apart from the duty to disclose. An examination of
case law on evident partiality demonstrates that a duty to disclose, absent
an independent duty to investigate, is simply insufficient to resolve the
problem at hand. Second, it notes that the duty to disclose is an ongoing
duty, but it does not extend that ongoing vigilance in terms of an actual
investigation. Third, the AAA / ABA Code’s language is imprecise;
what exactly constitutes a “reasonable effort” is fairly unspecific and
open to subjective interpretation. What is a sufficient effort for one
arbitrator could very well be insufficient for another arbitrator, all
depending on the arbitrator’s business, expertise, connections, and
relationships, etc. Furthermore, it is unclear when “should” should in
fact mean “shall” in light of the fact that arbitrators “should make a
reasonable effort to inform themselves” of any potential conflicts and
any doubt as to whether to disclose “should be resolved in favor of

128

Am. Bar Ass’n, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes Canon
II(A)–II(B) (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercialdisputes.pdf
(emphasis added).
129
See Larson, supra note 12, at 900 (noting that “[t]he duty of disclosure defined by
the code encompasses a duty to investigate.”).
130
See Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048 (noting “[t]hat the lawyer forgot to run a conflict
check or had forgotten that he had previously represented the party is not an excuse.”).
131
Am. Bar Assn’n, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes
Canon II(C)–(D) (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercialdisputes.
pdf.
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disclosure.”132 As such, the AAA / ABA Code can be somewhat
confusing.133
At face value, it appears that an arbitrator, without doubt, must
disclose any conflicts to ensure impartiality. In order to have a
worthwhile disclosure, an arbitrator should affirmatively conduct an
investigation into possible conflicts of interest by running a conflict
check.134 Because the AAA / ABA Code merely recommends, and does
not require, disclosure and investigation, one is left with the suggestion
that an arbitrator can be a passive participant regarding a conflict, thus
potentially undermining an affirmative duty to investigate. Ultimately,
however, by recommending that an arbitrator should at least make some
effort to ascertain any potential conflicts of interest, the AAA / ABA
Code is a small, but important step toward an affirmative and freestanding duty to investigate. It is also quite illustrative of the
uncertainties and difficulties surrounding arbitrator impartiality.
B. The International Bar Association Guidelines
The IBA Guidelines are more helpful in establishing an arbitrator’s
duty to investigate possible conflicts. In fact, the IBA Guidelines
recommend an affirmative and free-standing duty to investigate.135 The
focal point of the IBA Guidelines regarding a duty to investigate centers
around “General Standard 7: Duty of Arbitrator and Parties.”136 General
Standard 7 explicitly states that “[a]n arbitrator is under a duty to make
reasonable inquiries to investigate any potential conflicts of interest, as
well as any facts or circumstances that may cause his or her impartiality
or independence to be questioned.”137 Furthermore, General Standard 7
posits that ignorance is no excuse if an arbitrator fails to investigate a
potential conflict.138 As a result, the IBA Guidelines squarely place a
132

Id. at Canon II(B) and II(D).
See Larson, supra note 12, at 900 (noting that “because of [the Code’s]
inconsistent language, an arbitrator might be confused regarding disclosure requirements
even when one looks exclusively to a single authority.”). For instance, Canon II(A) states
that arbitrators “should . . . disclose” any interests or relationships that could give rise to a
conflict, but Canon II(C) indicates that the “obligation to disclose” the aforementioned
interests or relationships is a “continuing duty which requires” an arbitrator “to disclose,
as soon as practicable . . . any such interests or relationships which may arise.” (emphasis
added).
134
ABA / AAA Code of Ethics at Canon II(B).
135
IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, General
Standard 7(c), approved on May 22, 2007, by the Council of the International Bar
Association, available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid
=e2fe5e72-eb14-4bba-b10d-d33dafee8918.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
133
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duty to investigate on the arbitrator.139 Interestingly, the IBA Guidelines
also place a similar duty to investigate on the parties and/or potential
parties to the arbitration proceeding.140 The IBA Guidelines are quite
notable in that they make the arbitrator and the parties responsible for
ensuring the impartiality and fairness of the arbitration proceeding by
conducting an investigation into potential conflicts of interest. Indeed,
they are unique, especially in the international commercial litigation
context.141 Consequently, the implications are quite straightforward: an
arbitrator possesses an affirmative and independent duty to investigate
potential conflicts and disclose his or her findings.142
Unlike the FAA or other arbitration rules, the aforementioned
model guidelines are, as previously indicated, not binding. However, the
clear distinction between the guidelines and the rules is quite noticeable.
Under governing arbitration rules, there essentially is no affirmative duty
to investigate. Yet under several model guidelines, an arbitrator does
have an affirmative duty to investigate. If an amendment to the
arbitration statutes themselves—particularly the FAA, such that an
arbitrator would be required to conduct an investigation into potential
conflicts—is not forthcoming any time in the near future, then it is
apparent that the entire arbitration process needs a new approach to
award vacatur based upon evident partiality.

139
Id. at Explanation to General Standard 7 (stating that [i]t is the arbitrator or
putative arbitrator’s obligation to make . . . enquiries and to disclose any information that
may cause his or her impartiality or independence to be called into question.”) (emphasis
added).
140
Id. at Explanation to General Standard 7 (stating that “any party or potential party
to an arbitration is, at the outset, required to make a reasonable effort to ascertain and to
disclose publicly available information that . . . might affect the arbitrator’s impartiality
and independence.”).
141
Compare the IBA Guidelines (recommending an affirmative duty to investigate)
with the American Arbitration Association’s International Arbitration Rules, which
posits no free-standing affirmative duty to investigate (stating that “[a]rbitrators acting
under these Rules shall be impartial and independent. Prior to accepting appointment, a
prospective arbitrator shall disclose to the administrator any circumstance likely to give
rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.”). See Am.
Arbitration Ass’n, International Arbitration Rules art. 7, P 1 (2008), available at
http://adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994#INTERNATIONAL%20ARBITRATION%20RULES.
142
See Peter L Michaelson, In International Arbitration, Disclosure Rules at the
Place of Enforcement Matter Too, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2007–Jan. 2008, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qu3923/is_200711/ai_n21279144/pg_6. See also Lee
Korland, Comment: What an Arbitrator Should Investigate and Disclose: Proposing a
New Test for Evident Partiality Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 53 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 815, 837 (2003) (proposing an affirmative defense based on an arbitrator’s lack of
knowledge after making a reasonable investigation into potential conflicts).
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V. A PROCESS REEVALUATION
A. Why Change is Needed: Party Self-Determination
Because the arbitrator impartiality calculus imposed by courts is
generally based upon an objective standard, measured not by the actual
arbitrator’s beliefs, but by a “reasonable person” standard, a new
approach to evident partiality is needed. Only by imposing an
affirmative free-standing duty to investigate on an arbitrator can one
achieve any measure of objectivity. Otherwise, one is left with the
inherent subjectivity of what an arbitrator knows or should have known,
predicated upon the actions the arbitrator did take or should have taken.
Giving credence to the intertwined notions of freedom of contract and
party self-determination, the parties themselves should evaluate an
arbitrator’s partiality instead of the arbitrator himself or herself.143 In this
regard, imposing an affirmative duty to investigate can be evaluated from
a public policy standpoint. It is more sensible for an arbitrator to bear the
burden of making the requisite inquiries into potential conflicts than it is
for the parties to run the risk of a partial arbitrator and ultimately, a
biased award with less than certain judicial recourse.
If, for example, an arbitrator subjectively believed that no conflict
of interest existed, yet failed to investigate and there was indeed a
conflict of interest, then the award will be subject to vacatur based on
nondisclosure of information the arbitrator constructively knew. Where,
however, an arbitrator has an affirmative duty to investigate into
potential conflicts of interest—a routine conflict check prior to the
commencement of an arbitration—the situation changes drastically.
Assuming the arbitrator does investigate, then there will be either no
conflicts or a potential conflict; but since the arbitrator would disclose
his or her findings to the parties, the parties could either waive the
conflict or request a new arbitrator. In either case, the parties are the
ultimate judges of an arbitrator’s impartiality, and they will not be left
wondering if they have all the information needed to make an informed
decision.144 Subjectivity is thus removed from the picture, and the goal
of objectivity is achieved. Hence, an affirmative duty to investigate,
similar to what the Ninth Circuit utilizes, is a useful tool in solving the
evident partiality problem.

143
See Judge Wiener’s dissent in Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century
Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2007).
144
See Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048 (citing Justice White’s concurrence) (noting that
“Commonwealth Coatings establishes that the parties rather than the arbitrators or the
courts should be the judges of the partiality of arbitrators.”).
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B. The Evident Partiality Dilemma and its Implications
It is apparent from an examination of judicial interpretations of
evident partiality under the FAA and of several arbitration model
guidelines that the field of arbitration faces a conundrum, both on a
domestic and international scale.
On one hand, arbitration is
theoretically meant to serve the goals of impartiality, finality, efficiency,
and cost-effective dispute resolution.145 However, when those goals are
not achieved (which occurs when an award is vacated based upon
evident partiality), it is quite clear that the integrity of the arbitration
process is called into question. When an award is vacated, what was
once meant to be a final decision becomes no longer final, what was
supposed to be an efficient manner of resolving a dispute turns into a
battle in the courtroom, and what was intended to be a cost-effective
process yields a very high price tag for all parties involved in
litigation.146
Because this problem affects the entire process of arbitration, the
solution must be one that supports and fosters the integrity of the process
as a whole. Admittedly, no easy solution exists—that much is apparent
from the divergence of judicial interpretation on evident partiality.147
Yet what is undoubtedly needed is a reevaluation of the arbitration
process. Specifically, a reevaluation of an arbitrator’s duty to the
arbitration process, to the parties, and to society is warranted. Only by
changing the lens through which one views arbitration can any sort of
solution emerge. Instead of looking at arbitration as being comprised of
individual components, evaluated on an ad-hoc basis, if one views
arbitration holistically, it becomes apparent that change is an absolute
must. Otherwise, arbitration becomes simply another avenue into the
courtroom and serves a limited purpose.
C. The Imposition of an Affirmative Duty to Investigate
Many commentators have observed the arbitrator evident partiality
dilemma, and some have suggested ways in which arbitration can and
cannot be changed.148 What appears to be missing from the calculus is
145

See 9 US NITA prec § 1 (2008).
Not only monetarily speaking, but also in terms of time spent in the course of the
arbitration.
147
See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 138 (2008).
148
See Korland, supra note 142, at 816, 823, 837 (noting that “[t]he law gets even
murkier when considering whether an arbitrator has a duty to investigate potential
conflicts of interest prior to hearing a case,” suggesting utilization of ANR Coal Co. v.
Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc.’s four prong test for evaluating evident partiality, and
proposing an affirmative defense based on an arbitrator’s lack of knowledge of a conflict
after making a reasonable investigation into the matter); Larson, supra note 12, at 881
146

214

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 6:191

an evaluation, if not suggestion, of imposing a legal affirmative duty on
an arbitrator to investigate potential conflicts prior to the commencement
of the arbitration proceeding.149 By imposing such an affirmative duty
on the arbitrator, the evident partiality problem could be alleviated, if
nothing else. Currently, it is merely the arbitrator’s ethical duty to
voluntarily undertake an investigation into any conflicts.150 In other
words, an arbitrator may or may not take such affirmative action.
Instead, an affirmative duty to investigate should be a legal mandate, for
an arbitrator’s failure to conduct a conflict check runs the serious risk of
making an inadequate disclosure to the parties and of a finding of evident
partiality, thus undermining the integrity of the arbitration process.
An affirmative duty to investigate ultimately stems from an
arbitrator’s ethical duty to the system and to the parties: that the
arbitrator is impartial and that the arbitration proceeding will similarly be
conducted in an impartial manner. A lawyer owes his or her client the
duty of loyalty.151 That duty prohibits a lawyer from undertaking
representation of another that is directly adverse to his or her client
without the client’s informed consent.152 A lawyer, prior to undertaking
representation of a client, is advised to run a conflict check in order to
ascertain any conflicts of interest.153 And, as previously mentioned, a
judge must adhere to a strict standard of impartiality. Such judicial
impartiality requires disqualification in any proceeding where the judge’s

(concluding that “[a] call for the courts to adopt a more uniform standard for determining
when a failure to disclose a conflict of interest will result in evident partiality warranting
vacatur may not be answered any time soon.”); Robertson, supra note 48, at 28
(lamenting that “until the Supreme Court breaks its almost 40 years of silence, vacatur
based on an arbitrator’s failure to disclose will continue to be betwixt and between.”).
149
See Korland, supra note 145, at 817. Korland proposes that arbitrators “should be
encouraged, but not legally compelled” to undertake an investigation. Id.
150
See, e.g., JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A
NUTSHELL 179–80 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that “[a]rbitrators act in a quasi-judicial capacity
. . . arbitrators must avoid both the appearance and reality of conflict of interest and
uphold the integrity and fairness of the arbitration process. It is important that potential
arbitrators make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether any existing or prior
financial, professional, family or social relationships might create an appearance of bias.
If so, they should disclose this information in order to preserve the integrity of the
arbitration process.”).
151
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6 (2003).
152
Id.
153
See Charles F. Forer, Ensuring Conflict-Free ADR, THE METRO. CORPORATE
COUNSEL, August 2000, at 14 (“A lawyer customarily ‘runs a conflict check’ as soon as a
prospective new client is on the horizon. But what about running a conflict check on the
person who has been selected to provide neutral mediation or arbitration services?” Forer
ultimately, and sadly, concludes that “the parties should not rely on the proposed neutral
to make his or her own conflict-determinations” and thus the parties should run a conflict
check on the arbitrator. ).
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impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”154 So too must an
arbitrator run a conflict check to ensure his or her own impartiality: the
arbitrator must undertake an investigation into potential conflicts of
interest and disclose his or her findings to the parties. Since an arbitrator
acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, his or her conflict check should include
an investigation into categories such as: any relationship between the
arbitrator and the parties; any past or present dealings between the
arbitrator and the parties’ attorneys; any financial, social, or professional
affiliation / interest between the arbitrator and a party or attorney in the
arbitration; and any relationship or interest between the arbitrator’s
family members and the parties or the parties’ attorneys to the dispute.155
Any limitations on the investigation, such as where the arbitration
involves a multitude of parties and a conflict check would be
overwhelming and unrealistic, must similarly be disclosed to the parties
beforehand. While the above categories may or may not be exhaustive,
the idea is to put as much information in the parties’ hands as possible,
thus allowing them to make an informed decision in either accepting the
arbitrator or requesting the appointment of a different arbitrator.
D. Procedural Features of a Duty to Investigate
Procedurally speaking, the imposition of an affirmative duty to
investigate is admittedly difficult to establish. It could theoretically be
achieved in several ways. First, one could impose an affirmative duty
via an amendment to the FAA that would explicitly require an arbitrator
to conduct an investigation in order to ensure impartiality. Given that the
Supreme Court has declined to resolve any of the evident impartiality
murkiness, one might conclude that in terms of statistical probability an
amendment to the FAA is more likely to occur.156 Realistically,
however, an amendment to the FAA is an unlikely option.157

154

See supra note 42.
Id. These categories are not new. See, e.g., 28 USC § 455 (2008): Disqualification
of Justice, Judge, or Magistrate. See also Chernick & Taylor, supra note 4, at 186
(referencing California Ethics Standards Standard 7). Worth noting, California adopted
the most comprehensive and extensive state law on arbitrator disclosure, requiring a
proposed arbitrator to disclose information dating back five years, as required under
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.9(a).
156
See Robertson, supra note 48.
157
See James Hosking et al., Unintended Consequences of Proposed Amendments to
Federal Arbitration Act, International Law Office, Jan. 8, 2009, available at
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=e4b5b897-d7f5-4b0fa0c1-04c059527baa (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) (noting that “[s]ince they were enacted in
1925, most of the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act have not changed.”).
155
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Second, since the Ninth Circuit appears to be moving in the
direction of imposing an affirmative duty on an arbitrator,158 the courts
could uniformly adopt an affirmative duty to investigate. While this
solution appears ideal and sufficiently warranted, it is obviously not the
current standard.159 As long as the courts interpret and evaluate evident
partiality in different ways, the judicial approach to evident partiality will
likely remain piecemeal and unsatisfactory.
At a bare minimum, all arbitrators need to voluntarily undertake an
investigation into potential conflicts in order to make the requisite
disclosures to the parties. There may not be a perfect solution, or even
an easy solution, to imposing this duty. Nonetheless, the need for an
affirmative duty to investigate remains. The parties to an arbitration
need to be assured that the arbitrator is impartial. And, society in general
needs to be assured of the integrity of the arbitration process. Such
assurances can only come about if an arbitrator possesses a legal and
affirmative duty to investigate conflicts of interest. Even if most
arbitrators currently run conflict checks as part of their normal practice,
not all arbitrators do so. In the end, crossing one’s fingers and hoping
that all arbitrators run a conflict check prior to the start of an arbitration
proceeding is, unfortunately, a futile endeavor.
VI. CONCLUSION
Leaving evident partiality in its current state is unsatisfactory and
untenable. From the state courts to the circuit courts, there is a myriad of
judicial interpretations and approaches to evident partiality.160 There is
no uniform standard, thus leaving courts to examine evident partiality on
a case-by-case basis.161 Under the current framework, an arbitrator’s
“subjective good faith” is clearly not the defining criterion.162 Yet, even
an arbitrator’s constructive knowledge can give rise to evident
partiality.163
To eliminate the subjective disconnect between what an arbitrator
knows or should know in order to make a sufficient disclosure, an
158
See New Regency Prod., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 1101 (9th
Cir. 2007); Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1043.
159
See Steven Smith et al., International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 42 INT’L
LAW 363, 368–69 (2008) (“The Second Circuit’s refusal to impose a free-standing duty
to investigate seems at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in New Regency, which
found an affirmative duty to investigate when a change in circumstances could potentially
create conflicts.”).
160
See supra Part I.
161
Id.
162
Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 139.
163
Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1049.
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affirmative duty to investigate is needed. An arbitrator’s ethical duty to
investigate potential conflicts needs to become a positive, legal mandate.
While some arbitrators might find an affirmative duty to investigate
time-consuming and redundant (after all, an arbitrator is obliged to make
disclosures to the parties in the first place), in order to make an adequate
disclosure, an arbitrator must first investigate into any potential conflicts.
That is the only way an arbitrator can objectively know if there are any
conflicts which might affect his or her impartiality. And, that is the only
way in which the parties can be assured that their neutral will truly be
neutral. An affirmative duty to investigate is a critical part of the evident
partiality equation. It ensures impartiality in the here and now, and it
fosters and upholds the integrity of the arbitration process for the future.

